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Wn.Ls-AssERTION OF Rcoms UNDER MoRTMAIN STATUTE AS VIOLATION

action was brought by an executor for construction of a will, made five months before testator's death, which attempted to
make bequests to various charities. The bequests were "invalid" under the terms
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of the Ohio mortmain statute1 because the will was executed less than a year
before death. A no-contest clause2 in the will declared that any person attacking
it in any way would be barred from any beneficial interest, but there was no gift
over in the event of such a contest. The charitable gifts were in the residuary
clause, and there was no substitutionary gift in the event that the charitable
bequest failed. The probate court held the bequests to the charities invalid,
declaring that the property passed to testator's son and daughter by intestacy.
On appeal, held, affirmed. Since the gifts to the charities were void and not
merely voidable under the statute, the action by the children did not amount to
a contest in violation of the no-contest provision. Kirkbride v. Hickock, 155 Ohio
St. 293, 98 N. E. (2d) 815 (1951).
The question of whether a charitable bequest which is "invalid" under a
mortmain statute is void or merely voidable seems never before to have been
litigated in the context of an attack on a will containing a no-contest clause.8
Such statutes have been most frequently construed in cases involving the problem
of whether or not those in the protected class may waive their statutory rights.4
Since it has been universally held, 5 even in Ohio, that such statutes are designed
only to protect the testator's issue from ill-considered disinheritance by a dying
parent and not to prevent charities from holding property, bequests of the sort
in the principal case are deemed voidable and not void where waiver is involved.
This interpretation leaves the children free to waive their rights, which seems
proper inasmuch as the statute was designed for their exclusive benefit. In at
least one jurisdiction6 the right is automatically waived unless a contest is
1 The relevant portions of the statute are as follows: "If a testator dies leaving issue
of his body .•• and the will of such testator gives, devises or bequeaths the estate of such
testator, or any part thereof, to a benevolent, religious, educational or charitable purpose • • .
such will as to such gift, devise or bequest, shall be invalid unless it was executed according
to law, at least one year prior to the death of the testator." Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938)
§1054-5. The other type of American "mortmain" statute limits the percentage of his
estate which a testator can leave to charity, rather than requiring him to make his will a
designated number of months before death. These statutes are to be distinguished from
the English Statutes of Mortmain, which were not concerned with the private needs of the
testator's heirs but rather with effectuating a public policy against the holding of property
in perpetuity by the "dead hand" of a charity. See 1 PAGE, WxLLs §39 (1941).
2 Such provisions are also loosely called "in t~orem" clauses. The term "contest" is
used here in a somewhat broader sense than usual to include an attack on specific bequests
in an admittedly valid will. Generally a contest means only opposition to the admission of
the will to probate-an attack on the whole will on such grounds as improper execution or
revocation. See 4 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §428, comment b (1944).
s Unger v. Loewy, 202 App. Div. 213, 195 N.Y.S. 582 (1922), reversed on other
grounds, 236 N.Y. 73, 140 N.E. 201 (1923), is apparently the only case in which the
possibility of a conflict between a no-contest provision and the policy of a mortmain statute
has arisen. The court was not called upon to resolve the question because the charities
involved did not even contend that the statute could be avoided by a no-contest clause.
4 The cases are collected in 154 A.L.R. 682 (1945). The question of waiver was also
raised in the instant case, but the court dismissed it without any very illuminating discussion of the problems involved.
5Jd. at 684.
6 New York: In re Sonderling's Will, 157 Misc. 231, 283 N.Y.S 568 (1935).
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brought; the Ohio probate court's express holding in a recent waiver case7 that
a bequest like the one under consideration was not void but voidable seems to
indicate that some affirmative action is necessary in that jurisdiction to prevent
a named charity from taking under the will and to avail the protected heirs of
their statutory right. Logically, in view of the courts' pronouncements on the
"waivability" of the statute-given right, it would seem that they would have to
hold such charitable bequests only voidable in all situations. In the instant
case the court faced that logical difficulty unnecessarily, 8 but in cases where there
is a gift over or a residuary clause separate from the provisions for charity it will
be of considerable importance whether a court calls the bequest void or voidable.
Where there is a gift over in event of contest, for example, an attack will deprive the contesting party of his inheritance if the charitable gift is only voidable, whereas if it is considered to be void he will be able to prevent the charity
from taking without having made a contest within the legal meaning of the
term.9 The Ohio court could have reached the result in the principal case and
still remained consistent with its earlier analysis of such bequests by admitting
them to be voidable in all cases, but refusing to give effect to a no-contest provision where it would render the statute nugatory. The court would seem to be
on sounder ground, however, in enforcing a no-contest clause, even where doing
so would nullify the protection given by the statute; for if such a statute can be
set aside by waiver, there is no logical reason why it should not be permitted
to be suspended by a no-contest clause, particularly when the policy behind the
American statutes is considered.10
William K. Davenport

7 Deeds

v. Deeds, 42 Ohio Op. 384, 94 N.E. (2d) 232 (1950), noted in 20 Umv.

Cm. L. REv. 308 (1951).
8 Jn the absence of a gift over or a residuary disposition to others, the children would
have taken their shares under the will as well as the shares intended for the charities by
intestacy even if the court had declared the latter only voidable and hence found a breach
of the no-contest provision. By holding the charitable bequests void and finding no breach
of the no-contest clause, the court permitted the children to have the same net share as
they would have received by the alternative interpretation, though they took in this case
only part by intestacy and took their originally intended share under the will.
9 Even where a charitable bequest is deemed void, it is presumably necessary that
someone in the protected class raise the issue in order to prevent the charity from taking.
As this court conceives of it, however, such affirmative action technically does not amount
to a contest; but it is doubtless mincing words to say, "No action of testator's children made
the gifts to the charities invalid; the statutory law of Ohio accomplished that." Principal
case at 302.
10 This is the position of the Restatement as to the instant type of statute. It would
not, however, give effect to a no-contest provision where the attack was based on the
invalidity of a bequest under the English type of mortmain statute, "primarily designed to
curtail charitable ownership." 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §429(2)(b) and illustration 2
(1944). This view is approved in Browder, "Testamentary Conditions against Contest
R~ed," 49 CoL. L. REv. 320 at 331 (1949).

